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Abstract
This special issue of Foundations of Physics collects together articles
representing some recent new perspectives on the hole argument in the
history and philosophy of physics. Our task here is to introduce those
new perspectives.
1 Introduction
Few topics in the philosophy of physics have received more attention in
the past forty years than Einstein’s hole argument. The history of the
subject is perhaps well-known, but worth repeating. In 1913, Einstein
presented the hole argument in an effort to show that there could be
no adequate “generally covariant” or diffeomorphism-invariant theory of
gravity, instead advocating his erroneous Entwurf field equations1. But
by the end of 1915, he had rejected the hole argument and the Entwurf
theory, in part because he had found general relativity. Over the subse-
quent decades, the hole argument would reappear in the work of various
groups on quantum gravity, usually together with a standard story: Ein-
stein’s 1913 blunder was a failure to realise that he had chosen a preferred
coordinate system, and so prematurely rejected general covariance. In the
Entwurf theory the preferred coordinate system arose in the description
of a Newtonian limit, and in the hole argument it arose in the explicit
choice of a metric.2
This simple perspective on the hole argument changed following a re-
markable event in the history of science: the discovery of Einstein’s note-
book of scratchpad calculations during those crucial years. They were
discovered by John D. Norton and John Statchel in the Einstein Archive
at Princeton, miscatalogued as lecture notes from the University of Zurich.
1The Entwurf theory was published by Einstein and Grossman (1913). Einstein formulated
various versions of the hole argument in 1913-1914; for a discussion, see Norton (1984, §5).
2See Giovanelli (2013, 2019) for further details on the long history of the point coincidence
argument in quantum gravity. See Lanczos (1972, p.13-14) for a classic expression of the
‘standard story’ of Einstein’s supposed blunder.
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Working independently following this discovery, Stachel (1989)3 and Nor-
ton (1984) argued that Einstein’s Entwurf theory and hole argument were
not trivial blunders, but the result of deeper metaphysical convictions ac-
cording to which, “point events of the spacetime manifold are incorrectly
thought of as individuated independently of the [metric] field itself” Nor-
ton (1984, 256). Meanwhile, John Earman was working on the bearing
of Leibniz’s thinking on a similar view, following some early thinking of
Howard Stein.4 Soon after, Norton, working now in collaboration with
John Earman, argued that Einstein’s argument could be reconstructed
in a way that was still relevant to contemporary debates in philosophy
of physics, as a Leibniz-inspired reductio of a metaphysical conviction to
the reality of spacetime points that they dubbed “manifold substantival-
ism” (Earman and Norton; 1987). Since then, hundreds of papers have
appeared responding to the Earman-Norton argument, and much of the
subsequent literature in the foundations of general relativity and elsewhere
in philosophy of physics has been shaped by these debates.
The Earman-Norton version of the argument may be put as follows.
Let (M, g) be a relativistic spacetime. Choose an open set O with compact
closure (the “hole”), assumed to be a proper subset of M . Let d : M →
M be a diffeomorphism, which we assume to be the identity on M/O,
and to differ from the identify somewhere within O. To make the point
especially striking and to follow Einstein’s original argument (though this
is not essential), let us suppose (M, g) is a solution to Einstein’s equation
for some stress-energy tensor T that happens to vanish within O. Now
consider the spacetime (M,d∗g), where d∗ is the pullback along d. (We
assume that g and d have been chosen so that there exists some point in
O at which d∗(g) 6= g.) It follows from the foregoing that this spacetime,
too, is a solution to Einstein’s equation, with source term T . We now
have two spacetimes, (M, g) and (M,d∗g), with the same sources, which
differ within O; but which, by virtue of being isomorphic, do not differ in
any of their observable properties, even in principle.
Now suppose that one accepts “manifold substantivalism”: that is, one
believes that the manifold M represents spacetime, independently of any
of the fields defined on M . Then one is committed, it would seem, to the
claim that (M, g) and (M,d∗g) represent different physical possibilities,
corresponding to different assignments of metrical values to points within
O; but also that these two possibilities are empirically indistinguishable
from one another. It follows that no amount of information about the
metric (and sources) outside of O can be sufficient to determine the value
of the metric at points within O. For instance, suppose that Σ is a spatial
slice “before” O (in a spacetime with temporal orientation). No speci-
fication of initial data on O can determine the subsequent evolution of
g within O. Thus the manifold substantivalist is committed to a radi-
cal form of indeterminism. Conversely, Earman and Norton suggest this
conclusion “can be easily escaped by just accepting Leibniz equivalence”,
3Stachel’s article was originally delivered as a talk in 1980, but only appeared in print in
1989.
4This latter part of the history, and especially Stein’s contribution, is less-often told; see
Weatherall (2020).
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which is the view that (M, g) and (M,d∗g) (and, indeed, all isometric
spacetimes) represent the same physical situation. This, they argue, is
tantamount to denying manifold substantivalism.
The early literature on the hole argument, following on the heels of
the landmark Earman-Norton paper, focused on metaphysical issues.5 Is
there a form of “substantivalism” that avoids indeterminism? Various
authors defended versions of substantivalism—dubbed, with a distinctly
perjorative flavor, “sophisticated substantivalism” by Belot and Earman
(1999), though this name has since been reclaimed by the sophisticates—
according to which either (a) of the various isomorphic spacetimes gener-
ated by the hole argument and similar constructions, only one represents
a “real” physical possibility (e.g. Maudlin; 1988; Butterfield; 1989); or
else (b) all of those isomorphic spacetimes represent a single possibility,
which is nonetheless a possibility in which spacetime is a substance (e.g.
Brighouse; 1994; Rynasiewicz; 1994; Hoefer; 1996). By the end of the
1990s, there was a broad (albeit hardly universal) consensus that sub-
stantivalism remained defensible in light of the hole argument; but that
it required greater subtlety than anyone would have expected before Ear-
man and Norton published their argument, because the hole argument
effectively excluded manifold substantivalism, allegedly the most natural
(substantivalist, realist) interpretation of general relativity.
2 The hole argument, revisited
In the past decade, two papers have appeared that have challenged this
rough consensus, and which have led to renewed interest in the hole ar-
gument and related issues. The first, by Shamik Dasgupta, appeared in
2011. Dasgupta’s principal contention was that sophisticated substanti-
valism, in its various guises, is too facile. The reason is that the hole
argument, for instance as expressed above, concerns assumptions about
modality and determinism; the sophisticated substantivalist responds to
it by denying those assumptions. He then insists that without those as-
sumptions, the hole argument does not go through, and the challenge to
substantivalism fails. But, Dasgupta argues, to deny these assumptions is
a “bare modal claim” that avoids a certain challenge without providing a
positive account of what the metaphysics of spacetime substantivalism is
meant to be. Moreover, denying the modal assumptions needed to run the
hole argument does not avoid the central issue lurking in the background
of hole-argument-style constructions, which is that the structure a sub-
stantivalist wishes to attribute to the world—a structure that includes,
among other things, points of space/time that have some ontological sta-
tus independent of matter—is superfluous within general relativity, as
demonstrated by the existence of isomorphic spacetimes with the same
qualitative properties, differing in how those qualitative properties are
associated with those substantival points. Dasgupta concludes that no
satisfactory substantivalist position has ever been articulated, much less
defended, within general relativity.
5For recent reviews of the literature, see (Pooley; 2013) and (Norton; 2019).
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The second article, by one of us (Weatherall), first appeared online in
2014.6 Weatherall argues that the hole argument, as stated by Earman
and Norton and in the ensuing literature, trades on a subtle mathematical
error. The hole argument involves considering two isomorphic models of
general relativity, which we will now call (M, g) and (N,h), where we
suppose there exists some diffeomorphism f : M → N such that f∗(h) =
g. One then makes two claims: first, that these two spacetimes are, in
some sense, the same, because they are isomorphic; and second, that
they are nonetheless different, because they make different assignments
of metrical values to points. It is the first claim that supports the idea
that whatever else is the case, there is no empirically discernible difference
between these models, whereas it is the second claim that supports the
idea that these models represent prima facie different possibilities. But,
Weatherall argues, these claims are each true only relative to certain maps:
the first claim is true relative to the isomorphism f ; whereas the second
is true only relative to some other map, which by construction is not
an isomorphism. The hole argument then requires one to assert both
claims together, even though there is no map relative to which both are
true.7 The fact that this second map is necessary is obscured by the fact
that in standard presentations of the Earman-Norton hole argument, the
two spacetimes are written with the same symbol, “M”, representing the
manifold in both cases. This choice misleadingly invites one to compare
the manifolds with the identity map on M , even when that is not the
appropriate or salient standard of comparison.
Weatherall goes on to argue that what is truly at issue is what struc-
ture one should take a model of general relativity to have. On his view,
one ought to understand models of general relativity to have the structure
of a Lorentzian manifold, (M, g), which is defined (like all mathematical
objects) only up to isomorphism; whereas the hole argument apparently
invokes further structure, namely, structure that permits one to distin-
guish between isomorphic Lorentzian manifolds. This extra structure
represents the sorts of facts about spacetime points that the manifold
substantivalist wants to attribute to the world. But, Weatherall argues,
Lorentzian manifolds do not have enough structure to express those facts.
And so the hole argument should really be viewed as an argument against
a subtly different position from the one it is generally taken to refute. It
is not successful, he claims, as an argument that reifying the structure
of a model of general relativity leads to indeterminism; but it is effective
as an argument against adding, to the standard formalism of general rel-
ativity, additional structure that would represent the sorts of facts that
the manifold substantivalist wishes to attribute to the world. On this
latter interpretation, the hole argument is compelling, though one might
think that much simpler arguments, such as arguments from structural
parsimony, would rule against manifold substantivalism, too.
Dasgupta and Weatherall are motivated by very different concerns,
and their papers are targeted at somewhat different audiences. But there
is a certain sympathy between their positions. In both cases, they aim to
6It was accepted for publication in July 2015, but only appeared in print in 2018.
7See, also, Shulman (2017), who independently offers a nearly identical argument.
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shift the discussion away from analyses of the modal character of space-
time invited by the hole argument, and refocus on issues of what structure
we should attribute to space and time and why. Still, there is a major
disagreement between them, which concerns just how the models of gen-
eral relativity relate to that structure. Are those models best understood
as representing the structure that Dasgupta associates with “thick” sub-
stantivalism, where the basic entities are spacetime points with “primitive
identity”, as Dasgupta suggests? Or are they best understood as having
the capacity to represent (only) a weaker structure, consisting of just those
geometrical properties that are preserved by isomorphisms, as Weatherall
would have it?
In the years since these papers appeared, a new literature on the hole
argument has developed, with a focus shaped by the reframing of the
issues offered by Dasgupta and Weatherall, respectively. The present spe-
cial issue collects together a broad and representative, though hardly com-
plete, sample of these papers. It originated as the proceedings of a one-
day workshop organized by one of us—Roberts—at the London School of
Economics in July of 2016; several of the papers included here (those by
Roberts, Fletcher, and Ladyman) were presented and discussed at that
meeting. Other papers in the volume come from participants at the meet-
ing (e.g., Weatherall and Dougherty), but were not presented there; and
still others were solicited from philosophers who could not attend, but
whose perspectives on these issues we felt were important to include. We
believe that gathering these papers together in a single journal issue pro-
vides a valuable resource for scholars who wish to see the current state
of the field. Not everything that might appropriately appear here does—
notable absences include the recent paper by Belot (2017) arguing against
the widely held view, presupposed in much of the new literature, that dif-
feomorphisms are necessarily “symmetries”; and as-yet unpublished work
by Arledge and Rynasiewicz (2019) and by Pooley and Read (2019) criti-
cizing Weatherall’s position—but what does appear is nonetheless repre-
sentative.
The papers collected here attend to three intertwined threads: issues
of representation; issues of mathematical foundations; and issues of deter-
minism.
3 Issues of representation
Earman and Norton’s hole argument was packaged together with a claim
about representation, the now-famous principle of Leibniz Equivalence,
which they characterised as the claim that, “diffeomorphic models repre-
sent the same physical situation” (Earman and Norton; 1987, p.522).
The first thread of issues in this special issue concerns the meaning and
correct usage of such representations: what can a mathematical object
represent in the physical world, what can it not, and how is this related
to the symmetries of that object? In his paper “On Representational
Capacities, with an Application to General Relativity”, Fletcher (2020)
develops an account of the representational capacities of mathematical
structures—a concept that Weatherall invokes, but does not adequately
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develop. Fletcher explores how, on his account, the isomorphisms between
mathematical models, including the automorphisms of those models, con-
strain those models’ representational capacities. He ultimately defends a
view where, in general, one should expect a many-to-many relationship
between the models of a physical theory and the physical situations that
may be represented by this theory, but with the constraint that isomor-
phic models should always be taken to have the same representational
capacities. He then uses the machinery he has developed to offer a critical
reply to (Belot; 2017), noted above.
In “Regarding ‘Leibniz Equivalence’,” Roberts (2020) offers a new
analysis of Leibniz equivalence, the doctrine that Earman and Norton
(1987) identify as the natural resolution of the hole argument. Earman
and Norton define Leibniz equivalence as the view that isomorphic mod-
els of general relativity represent the same physical possibility. Roberts,
by contrast, distinguishes two different ways in which one might inter-
pret this position. One, which he calls “weak Leibniz equivalence”, is the
view that isomorphic models may represent the same possibility, if one
allows the representational relation between the model and the world to
vary. The second view, which he calls “strong Leibniz equivalence”, is the
view that isomorphic models represent the same possibility with respect
to the same representation relation, understood here as a map from the
underlying manifold M of a relativistic spacetime to locations in space
and time. He goes on to argue that weak Leibniz Equivalence is irrel-
evant to the hole argument, while strong Leibniz equivalence is strictly
false. Roberts points out that the hole argument can still be seen as a
more direct argument against substantivalism, independent of the status
of Leibniz equivalence, and urges that attention be shifted away from the
latter. Meanwhile, Roberts contends, authors like Weatherall and Fletcher
conflate the weak and strong versions of the doctrine when claiming that
once one attends carefully to mathematical practice, the hole argument is
“blocked”. A version of his critique appeared online in 2014.
Bradley and Weatherall (2020), in their paper “On Representational
Redundancy, Surplus Structure, and the Hole Argument,” explore what
it means to say that a physical theory exhibits “representational redun-
dancy”. They distinguish three different senses of “representational re-
dundancy”, and argue that each of these has importantly different conse-
quences regarding, for instance, whether the models of a theory exhibiting
such redundancy should be said to have “surplus structure”. They pro-
ceed to apply these distinctions first to Yang-Mills theory, where they
contrast their position with other ones recently defended by Weatherall
(2016) and (especially) Nguyen et al. (2018), and then to the hole argu-
ment. They argue that the hole argument highlights the fact that general
relativity has representational redundancy in one sense—but not a sense
that signals surplus structure.
Finally, in his paper “General-Relativistic Covariance,” Dewar (2020)
comes at a closely related set of issues—concerning the hole argument,
symmetries, and structure—from a different direction. He develops an ac-
count of the “general covariance” often attributed to general relativity. His
motivation is a tension that he identifies between the “dynamical view” of
spacetime theories, as developed by Brown (2005) and others, and Leibniz
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equivalence, as discussed by Earman and Norton. (We will not attempt
here to resolve the question of whether Dewar’s analysis runs aground
on the distinction between weak and strong Leibniz equivalence drawn
by Roberts.) The version of the dynamical view that Dewar considers is
one in which the structure of spacetime should be precisely that which is
invariant under the symmetry group of the dynamics governing matter.
But as Dewar argues, while this recipe for identifying spacetime structure
can be used to extract Minkowski spacetime from Maxwell’s equations
expressed in standard coordinates on R4, it is much more difficult to see
how it is supposed to apply once we allow for curved spacetime, as in
general relativity. He suggests, in particular, that the recipe would lead
one to conclude that spacetime is represented by a bare manifold, much
like the Earman-Norton manifold substantivalist does; and thus, that it
is difficult for an advocate of the dynamical view to accept the standard
response to the hole argument. To avoid this conclusion, he proposes that
one should think of the diffeomorphism freedom of general relativity as
corresponding to an “internal” symmetry of the theory, analogous to the
internal symmetries of Yang-Mills theory.
4 Issues of mathematical foundations
A second theme reflected in this special issue concerns further discussion
of whether the hole argument can be expressed using only the structure of
a Lorentzian manifold, when one insists on modern ‘constructive’ founda-
tions for mathematics. In their paper “The Hole Argument in Homotopy
Type Theory,” Ladyman and Presnell (2020), drawing on an argument to
the same effect by Shulman (2017), contend that the hole argument cannot
even be expressed within Homotopy Type Theory, as long as one under-
stands a Lorentzian manifold as a dependent type (which, they argue, one
should). Homotopy type theory provides an approach to the foundations
of mathematics that is ‘constructive’ in the spirit of constructive set the-
ory and intuitionistic logic (Univalent Foundations Program; 2013). It is
often presented together with an axiom called ‘Univalence’, which its sup-
porters characterise as expressing the claim that equivalent mathematical
structures can be identified. This kind of claim is strikingly similar to
the expression of Leibniz Equivalence introduced in Earman and Norton’s
hole argument, and so one might worry that Leibniz equivalence is “built
in” to Homotopy Type Theory through this axiom. But, as Ladyman and
Presnell clarify, the assessment of the hole argument in Homotopy Type
Theory depends only on the structure of dependent types, and not on
other, potentially controversial, parts of Homotopy Type Theory like the
Axiom of Univalence. In order to express the hole argument, they con-
clude, one would need to introduce a new structure to represent spacetime,
using ordered pairs rather than dependent types.
Dougherty (2020), too, considers the hole argument from the per-
spective of Homotopy Type Theory in his paper “The Hole Argument,
take n,” but he comes to a somewhat different conclusion. He contends
that the arguments of Weatherall (2018) (and Shulman (2017)) show that
proper attention to mathematical practice, at least as formalized within
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Homotopy Type Theory, does resolve what he calls the “verificational-
ist dilemma” of the hole argument, which is that the substantivalist is
apparently committed to observationally indistinguishable, but nonethe-
less distinct, states of affairs. (It is this dilemma that Dasgupta (2011)
takes to be a stronger argument against thick substantivalism than the
modal version of the argument emphasized by Earman and Norton (1987)
and others.) But, Dougherty continues, Homotopy Type Theory does not
resolve a second dilemma, which he calls the “indeterminism dilemma”.
To defend this, he makes a proposal concerning how to formulate “deter-
minism” within Homotopy Type Theory, and then concludes that on this
definition, general relativity as standardly formulated is indeterministic
after all. He goes on to argue that the hole argument should thus motivate
adopting a different formalism for general relativity—or rather, a different
category of models of general relativity—than philosophers have generally
supposed. He suggests that the category he endorses is a better reflection
of how working mathematical physicists think about general relativity.
Dougherty’s contention that there are problems concerning the hole
argument and determinism that persist, or even come into clearer focus,
in light of the recent literature, touches on a third theme of the issue: How
should one understand determinism in the context of the hole argument?
The final two papers in the volume revisit, in light of more recent de-
velopments, arguments due to Melia (1999), Belot (1995), and Brighouse
(1997), concerning the proper notion of “determinism” in physics.
5 Issues ofdeterminism
Dougherty’s paper overlaps a third thread of discussion on determin-
ism. In her paper, “Confessions of a (Cheap) Sophisticated Substanti-
valist,” Brighouse (2020) emphasizes the tension between “sophisticated
substantivalism”—as realized, in particular, by the “thin substantivalism”
articulated by Dasgupta—and a particular kind of dynamical symmetry
breaking. The classic example, here, is due to Wilson (1993). Consider a
cylindrical tower, perfectly symmetric along its central axis, with a weight
on top of it that is likewise perfectly symmetric about the axis of symmetry
of the tower. Suppose, finally, that this tower-and-weight system exists in
a universe where there is some force acting on the weight, directed down-
wards along the axis of symmetry of the tower, and that there is nothing
else in the universe that could break the axial symmetry. We suppose the
tower will buckle at a particular time, and that the angle, relative to the
central axis of the tower, is not specified.
In how many different ways can the tower buckle? That is, are there
distinct possible histories, differing only with regard to the direction of
buckling, even though all such histories are, in a straightforward sense, iso-
morphic?8 Brighouse, following a long tradition, argues that there ought
to be a meaningful sense in which this sort of symmetry breaking is an
instance of real indeterminism: the column may buckle in many different
directions. But, she contends, this intuition is not within the scope of
8We set aside the question of whether the buckling we countenance here is compatible with
any known theory of physics.
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what is describable according to thin substantivalism (and sophisticated
substantivalism more generally) because the various putatively distinct
histories of the cylinder do not differ in any of the “thin” facts that sup-
port differences between possible worlds on such accounts. One might take
the moral to be that substantivalists’ attempts to thread the needle be-
tween denying the indeterminism of the hole argument while maintaining
the indeterminism of Wilson columns rest on bare modal claims, whereas
if one follows Dasgupta’s suggestion that the substantivalist must give a
more direct characterization of her position, the tension reappears.
Finally, in “The Hole Argument Against Everything,” Joshua Norton
(2020) contends that there is something deeply wrong with the reason-
ing involved in the hole argument. Consider: what the hole argument
is claimed to establish is that there are some (putative) facts accepted
by the substantivalist—namely, facts about at what spacetime point cer-
tain events occur—that are not determined by general relativity; from
this, Earman and Norton conclude that to accept those facts leads to the
unacceptable conclusion that the universe is indetermistic, and thus we
should deny them. But, Norton points out, there are arguably many puta-
tive facts that are not determined by general relativity. (As a provocative
example, he considers the existence of souls.) And yet it seems absurd
to claim that, because general relativity cannot determine such facts, we
should therefore reject them. The reason is simply that general relativity
does not bear on such matters. From this, Norton concludes that there is
something faulty in the hole argument itself: it takes for granted that a
physical theory must determine certain facts if those facts are to be mean-
ingful. But, he argues, whether this is so surely depends on the scope of
the theory. And so for the hole argument to go through, one needs to
provide a prior argument that facts about spacetime points are the sort
of thing that fall within the scope of the theory.
Here Norton’s argument has a certain resonance with Weatherall’s
argument (see also Stachel (1989)) that the substantivalist is committed to
structure that goes beyond what is needed (or generally used) to formulate
general relativity. But whereas Weatherall (and Dasgupta) argue that this
means one should reject that structure on Occamist grounds, Norton’s
position is that if this structure is not necessary for, or determined by,
the dynamics of general relativity, the question of whether it exists in the
world should be understood to be outside the scope of that theory. In
other words, Weatherall and Dasgupta rely on a premise that one might
be motivated to reject, which is that one should understand the structure
of spacetime to be precisely what is required for general relativity and no
more.
Taken together, these papers draw attention to important and unre-
solved issues in the foundations of general relativity, and of physics more
generally. Striking disagreements persist among the authors, and in all
of the papers, new arguments are given that challenge views defended by
others in the collection. We hope and expect that this collection will serve
as a launching point for further research in this area.
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